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3Abstract
Agenda for Change was a document, released in February 1999 by the Department of
Health, outlining major pay reform in the National Health Service (NHS).  A central
tenet of reform is flexibility, in terms of job roles and tasks, where existing and
traditional demarcation was judged to be a serious inhibitor to a modern health
service.  According to the current labour Government the NHS pay scheme is too
rigid with an incremental pay structure based only on longevity of service.
Progression through the pay scales is not currently linked to individual or team
performance. This has inhibited new skill acquisition and has restricted employees
from assuming extra responsibilities that new technology or modern working
practices might demand.
The focus of this research is centred on the way, in which the new pay framework
will operate and on what basis staff will be allowed to progress up the pay spines.
The guidelines describe modern flexible career paths and continuing professional
development as the determining factors for progression and these will be bound in a
performance-related pay structure.  Researchers in the field of HRM assert that there
is a lack of analytical work on the impact of performance-related pay in the public
sector and this is particularly acute in relation to the NHS.
This paper will analyse and evaluate the current reward management practices
prevalent in the NHS to identify the advantages and disadvantages in terms of
performance, motivation and reward.  It will also identify and establish if the new
pay structure achieves its' "principles and intentions" of increasing flexibility,
meeting the needs of patients, achieving a quality workforce with the necessary skills
and motivation, consistent with wider national HR strategies.
Key words: National Health Service, reward, performance, pay, human
resource management.
41. Introduction
The field of reward management has been of increasing interest to management and
human resource management (HRM) researchers in the past decade. This interest has
coincided with a trend amongst organisations to align employee performance to
organisational strategy. This alignment has led to the introduction of innovative
reward structures designed to encourage ‘appropriate’ behaviour. Although this trend
began in the private sector the public sector followed suit and there has been a
fundamental shift in the way public sector employees are rewarded. Despite this shift
there has been a lack of empirical research in this field to analyse the reasons for
change, what changes have taken place and, most important, the effects of these
changes (Dowling and Richardson, 1997; Bach, 2000; Hendry et al., 2000).
The lack of research has meant that knowledge in the field is disparate and often
conflicting.  This has been compounded by the sheer raft of employee policy reforms
instigated by the Conservative government during the 1980’s and 1990’s, which have
continued under the current Labour administration.  The aims of these policy reforms
range from a move to more individualised approach to employee relations, the drive
for flexibility and the need to curb spiralling health costs.  Grimshaw (2000) stated:
“Despite the apparent persuasiveness of the discourse around these
policy reforms, there is little empirical evidence to support the
arguments put forward; where such evidence exists, the difficulties of
‘testing’ the success of pay policies has generated conflicting results.”
(p. 944)
This paper seeks to explore the issues surrounding pay reform in the National Health
Service (NHS) by initially describing the research context which provides an insight
into the policy developments which have driven pay reform. It will state the aims of
my research and briefly outline my proposed research methods and then examine
details of the government’s pay reform strategy. To set my proposed research into
context it will explore in some depth the current pay practices in the National Health
Service (NHS) focussing on the raft of recent changes and the effect these have had
on flexibility.   The paper then examines performance-related pay (PRP) in the NHS
and sets that within a theoretical framework. Finally the objectives behind the
implementation of PRP will be examined because PRP forms the central role in the
government’s pay reform programme.
52. Research context
During their eighteen years in government the Conservative Party implemented a
series of reform initiatives aimed at radically altering employment practices in the
NHS. Despite their extensive reform programme “the emerging orthodoxy has been
that alterations in employment practices have failed to keep pace with the radical
changes in the structure and management of the NHS and that HRM has been
neglected". (Bach 1998). Organisations must frequently assess their reward strategy
and the decisions they make in this regard will ultimately determine the success or
failure of their organisation (Bergman et al. 1998).  Attempts were made to deal with
NHS pay and conditions at local trust level but severe pressure from employee and
professional representatives restricted the widespread reforms anticipated.  However,
it was the current Labour government who have instigated the most fundamental and
radical reforms to NHS pay and conditions of service with their proposal 'Agenda for
Change - Modernising the NHS Pay System'.
Reward strategies have developed to reflect, or even drive, the desire for “maximum
flexibility for individuals” (Cornelius, 1999).  Traditional payment structures have
proved to be too inflexible for a modernised NHS.  However, the proposed abolition
of automatic increments will disrupt the NHS at all levels and across all employees.
The new pay framework will introduce pay thresholds, related to a job evaluation
score, where progression is dependant upon responsibility, competence and
satisfactory performance, in effect a national performance appraisal system will be
formulated. Performance related pay is not new to the NHS and was first introduced
in the nursing profession in the early 1970's (Edmonstone 1996) with differing rates
of success.  Work by Coates (1996) uncovered the difficulties involved in
implementing and using performance appraisal within a trust.  Most notable was the
difficulty associated with setting measurable and appropriate performance objectives.
Research into the culture of an NHS trust by MacKenzie (1995) highlighted important
indicators of how NHS employees deal with change.  Disturbingly, the employees
“did not feel positive about the changes in the organisation” and that has important
implications for the management and communication of the proposed radical changes,
especially because they go straight to the heart of the employment relationship.
6Townley (1991) noted that performance monitoring and appraisal in the NHS, and in
the public sector generally, were often implemented in a “cost-cutting environment”,
rather than to reinforce behavioural norms.  Smith (1993) questioned the extent to
which the shift to incentive-based pay is still appropriate or strategic for modern
organisations.  Further, he believes that the rise in the use of incentive-based pay was
merely a result of the 1980's boom.  It is unclear how a national bureaucratic
organisation could implement a dynamic system of performance-related pay and what
the effects would be on motivation, morale and retention.
3. Agenda for change
Agenda for Change was a document, released in February 1999 by the Department of
Health, outlining major pay reform in the National Health Service (NHS).  The
catalyst for pay reform was the current Labour Government’s election pledge to
modernise the NHS, an ambitious ten-year plan. A central tenet of reform is
flexibility, in terms of job roles and tasks, signalling that traditional demarcation was
judged to be a considerable inhibitor to a modern health service. According to the
Government:
“The current NHS pay system inhibits service modernisation and is
widely regarded as unfair. It has failed to keep pace with change in
NHS practice and does not recognise that modern forms of health care
rely on flexible teams of staff working across traditional skill
boundaries.”  (DOH 1999)
Pay reform in an organisation as large at the NHS, with one million employees, is a
logistical and procedural minefield.  However, with seventy percent of the entire
health budget being spent on pay costs, it is potentially a lucrative area for the
Government.  It is precisely this issue that makes NHS pay reform such an important
area to research.  The Government clearly aims to use Agenda for Change as an
instrumental tool for instigating major culture change in the NHS, with the focus on
flexible service provision meeting the needs of patients (who are also tax payers).
They describe the current incremental pay structure as “irrelevant to the way the new
NHS works” and in its place they need a pay structure which maximises “the
personal contribution of individual members of staff working closely together.”
NHS staff are currently graded and paid dependant upon their profession or job title
and length of service.  It is felt that the narrow professional demarcation and focus on
7status not skills is misplaced. In its place will be a system that pays fairly and
equitably for work done, with career progression based on responsibility,
competence and satisfactory performance (DOH 2000).
The pay modernisation programme is seeking to determine a national strategy to
include core conditions of service to cover all staff, a national job evaluation
scheme, new pay spines and a framework for determining pay uplift.  The most
contentious issue and the central focus of my research is centred around the way the
new framework will operate and on what basis staff will be allowed to progress up
the pay spines.  The guidelines describe modern flexible career paths and continuing
professional development as the determining factors for progression and these will
be bound in a performance-related pay structure.  The guidelines will give a
framework for how staff can move up their pay spines as their skills and
responsibility grow and satisfactory performance is maintained (DOH 2000)
3.1 Current pay practices in the National Health Service
According to the Government the current NHS pay scheme  “has too rigid a structure
of increments based only on the calendar.” (DOH 2000) Progression through the pay
scales is currently not linked to individual or team performance. This has inhibited
new skill acquisition and restricted employees from assuming extra responsibility
that new technology or modern working practices have demanded.  The actual pay
rates and pay scales are being completely revised and simplified under Agenda for
Change. Although the new pay spines will be set nationally, and applied to all NHS
employees nationally; there will be scope for adjustments reflecting local market
forces or skill shortages.  Elliott and Duffus (1996) examined the emphasis on
relative pay with other employees in other sectors outside the NHS, often in the
private sector.
“Relative pay will be a critical determinant of the public sector’s
ability to attract, retain and motivate appropriate employees.  In tight
labour markets a deterioration in relative pay is likely to prejudice the
attainment of all three of these objectives of the pay structure.” (p. 71)
Elliott and Duffus (1996) outlined the major changes to public sector pay from 1970
to 1992.  Historically pay review bodies, income policies and wage councils were
the primary methods for setting pay levels in the NHS.  The Conservative
8Government during the 1980’s actively sought ways of blurring the boundaries
between private and public sector pay, making direct comparisons almost
impossible. According to Elliott and Duffus, this makes public sector workers
vulnerable because, in the case of the NHS, they are often the sole buyer, “a
monopsonist” of certain skills.
There have been several attempts to reform pay and working practices in the NHS
over the last twenty years.  The most far-reaching of these changes occurred during
the 1980’s when NHS hospitals became self-governing Trusts. To mirror this,
employees were ‘encouraged’ to move to local trust contracts, thus weakening
collective bargaining agreements and strengthening an individualistic approach to
pay negotiations.  Bach (1998) used case study analysis to examine the difficulties
faced by management and employees in making “radical changes in employment
practices.”  This research provided an invaluable insight into possible problems that
the latest reforms may encounter, even though Bach was researching in 1995 when
local pay was at its height.  His findings are poignant for current research because it
provides a useful historical context and it highlights the multitude of reforms NHS
employees have endured in the recent past.  Bach found that despite the intention of
local pay to provide more flexibility and autonomy for providers it was severely
restricted by the pressures and financial unpredictability of the internal market.
“Despite this explicit reform programme, managers remained severely
circumscribed in pursuing their human resource agenda by
developments outside their control.” (p. 573)
However, Bach’s findings uncovered problems with the plethora of national
performance targets, which meant service provision was constantly shifting, along
with funds, with employees having to meet altering patient care demands.  Further
complicating matters was the various interested parties involved in health care
management, for example the NHS Executive, the Local Heath Authority and
different purchasers.  With employment reforms specifically, the interested parties
were principally the representative professional bodies and trade unions.  Bach
expressly stated his concern over the difficulty in harmonising the new national pay
structure and retention of individual trust status.
9Further work by Bach (2000) examined the effect of public health sector reforms
and restructuring on employment practices generally. He stated that there was a
“lacuna” concerned with examining the effects of our largest employer, the state.
Using Britain for comparative analysis he scrutinised the distortion that the public
health sector in Europe, employing 9% of all European Union employees, had on
wider employment practices.  Public health has a significant impact on public
expenditure growth figures as well as unemployment figures.  This sets the current
pay reforms to be examined into a wider political and economic context. The
spiralling costs, for all European nations, of an ageing population and fast paced
technological medical innovations mean tight budgetary controls must be exercised
on medical expenditure.  These factors are further influenced and confused by the
adoption of market forces into health care management with a shift from
administrative to management driven hospital control.  All NHS trusts in Britain
have a dedicated team of financial personnel managing operational expenditure with
capital programmes designed to ensure maximum return on all assets.  Focussing on
the effects of pay determination Bach argues that there are few “unequivocal
benefits of a shift towards more decentralised bargaining.” (p. 932)
The contrasting desire to increase service flexibility and the pressure to drive down
employment costs does not sit comfortably with the aims of the current pay reform
programme.  The decentralisation of pay determination increases management
control and has led to a rise in performance related pay, according to Bach.  Even
so, Sweden has found performance–related pay difficult to implement because of
problems encountered with objective setting along with cultural conflicts between
merit pay and the health sector.  One specific instance from Britain found:
“Tight budgetary constraints often made it difficult to release
sufficient resources to reward good performance adequately, so small
merit pay increases were distributed across a sizeable number of staff
and accounted for only a small proportion of an individual’s pay.
Forced distributions were frequently used which frustrated managers
who believed they were unfairly denied a higher rating.” (p. 933)
A key feature of the literature is change, a feature that has become a permanent
characteristic of NHS management, primarily due to political intervention.  In this
respect Grimshaw (2000) sought to examine the effects and assess the outcome of
the introduction of the raft of new policies and procedures, designed to increase pay
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flexibility.  His findings revealed that there was a lack of robust and adequate
assessment of the impact of the various pay policies, particularly in terms of PRP.
He noted the apparent disparity between the evidence presented in the research
literature professing to test such initiatives and the apparent diversity of findings.
This has acute significance for the NHS pay modernisation process because,
according to Grimshaw, it is the relative distribution of wages and not the level of
public sector pay, that commands attention in studies of public sector pay
flexibility.
“Pay flexibility in relation to organisational flexibility involves the use
of pay to strengthen the links between pay and performance, or to
match pay with the operational requirements of the organisation, and,
it is argued, thereby generate higher quality goods and services and
overall efficiency improvements.” (p. 947)
Grimshaw argued that flexible pay practices harmonise flexible working practices,
such as those that the Government is keen to encourage in the NHS.  However, he
warns against the abandonment of traditional grading structures because of their
effect on the external labour market wage classifications. Also he questions whether
the adoption of new technological working practices actually erode hierarchical
structures.
3.2 Performance-related pay in the National Health Service: research to date.
Many researchers in the field of HRM concede that there is a lack of analytical
literature on the impact of performance-related pay in the public sector.  In an
attempt to address this apparent gap in the literature Marsden and Richardson (1994)
conducted research on the Inland Revenue, concentrating specifically on the
motivational impact of PRP.  It is useful to draw parallels of experience between the
NHS and other public bodies in the implementation of radical schemes so that
lessons learned can be benefited from, and costly mistakes avoided, protecting the
public purse.  Marsden and Richardson found that in terms of motivation the
employees stated that the PRP scheme had little impact.  Most worrying was the
perception of managers who carried out performance appraisals whose perception of
the scheme, in terms of having a positive impact on employee motivation, was very
sceptical. A large percentage, 79%, stated that performance pay had no impact on
their employee’s willingness to go ‘beyond contract’. To use an objective measure to
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examine their findings they used two ‘strands’. The first was Lawler’s (1971)
expectancy theory and the second was Latham and Locke’s (1991) goal-setting
theory.  Expectancy theory “stresses the importance of a series of links between
behaviour and the rewards accruing to that behaviour.” (p. 253).  Marsden and
Richardson concluded that:
“…the links between the appraisal system and the revenue’s
Performance Pay scheme in practice seem, to a degree, to have
alienated many staff. They may well have helped to degrade a system,
which, for other purposes, was entirely suitable.” (p. 255)
In contrast, goal-setting theory involves a framework including issues surrounding
clarity in objective setting and feedback during appraisals.  If employees have
clearly defined and achievable objectives set they are more likely to improve their
performance.  The employees at the Inland Revenue perceived that they were
already working to the “appropriate standard” which indicated failure in the PRP
system or simply that the management “had not been able to convince their staff to
the contrary.”
Performance-related pay has already been implemented for certain employment
groups in the NHS, notably managers.  Research by Dowling and Richardson
(1997) noted it was only “modestly successful.”  They note that there has been a
lack of empirical evidence to gauge the success or failure of PRP initiatives in the
NHS so conclusions cannot be drawn, or lessons learned, for the future.  The
introduction of PRP for management staff was in 1986, extended further in 1989 to
cover staff on senior management pay scales.  Dowling and Richardson describe a
PRP scheme mirrored by Kessler and Purcell’s (1992) three dimensions, namely the
setting of performance objectives for the year ahead, the assessment of those
objectives and the linking of those to a pay award.  This research concentrated on
managers’ perceptions of the effect PRP had on their motivation and working
patterns.  Dissatisfaction centred round the objective setting process and the link to
rewards, which was often negligible.  The most poignant finding from the research
was the perception of fairness, linked to the assessment of objectives and the
subsequent impact on motivation.  Despite the problem with linking performance
assessment to pay it is seen as an essential element of PRP because:
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“…in the absence of a formal system of PRP, a significant number of
assessors might not take seriously their obligation to set out and
subsequently monitor their subordinates’ objectives.  In this sense, the
pay link may be organisationally necessary for the whole system to
operate.” (p. 362)
Research focussing on performance appraisal in an NHS trust was conducted by
Redman et al. (2000).  They described a corporate PRP model with organisational
goals being cascaded down the hierarchy in the form of individual objectives.
However, only a quarter of the staff were included in the scheme, despite it being a
specific management objective to increase the number of staff included. This
signified an undercurrent of management scepticism and a lack of commitment to the
PRP process.  This manifested itself in several ways including the customising of
official appraisal documentation to “capture the nature of their roles.” It was
universally felt that there was a lack of central control of the PRP process by the
personnel function.  This research centred on the specific culture of the NHS being a
“colleague culture” where it was not seen to be appropriate to rock the boat.  Their
analysis of the appraisal process focussed on four key areas: management control,
employee motivation, training and development and rewards.  In terms of
management control their findings indicated that the PRP process inherently
cemented management authority and control over employees. There were examples
of management abuse of the appraisal process, which is particularly problematic and
difficult to detect.  Motivation was linked to the ‘Hawthorne effect’ where the
appraisal was an opportunity to have some quality time with their line manager.
Much of the appraisal rhetoric was unitaristic and seemed alien to a predominantly
pluralistic environment.  In terms of training and development there was little
evidence to support a finding that it took centre stage, in fact it did not feature at all
in twelve percent of respondent’s appraisals.  This is further compounded by fears
over the cost of training in a very fiscal environment.  Finally, the link to rewards
signalled problems, especially in terms of the appraisal process absorbing a huge
amount of resources, not mirrored in the financial outcome for the employee.  This
issue cannot be helped by the piecemeal approach to PRP on the whole in this
particular trust.  Richardson et al. concluded that until the fundamental problems
associated with PRP including uneven managerial commitment, continuity between
appraisals, the link with PRP and teamwork, and the appropriate nature of the
scheme as a whole the future looked problematical.
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3.3 An examination of the varying objectives for the implementation of PRP
The development of human resource management and a more strategic approach to
managing people at work lead to an upsurge in initiatives designed to harmonise the
needs of employers and employees. One of the simplest, although radical, ways of
converging these two ideologically divergent groups is through pay.  In the early
1990’s the focus turned to the link between pay and performance.  Kessler and
Purcell (1992) examined this issue and stated that:
“…there is evidence to indicate that, in the development of future
approaches to pay, considerable importance is being attached to
systems which seek to relate pay to individual performance or, more
specifically, attempt to translate and transmit market-based
organisational goals into personalised performance objectives or
criteria, while at the same time preserving the integrity of coherent
grading structures.” (p. 16)
Kessler and Purcell highlighted the organisational impact and the effects on the
employment relationship of performance-related pay initiates.  They stated that
there were two prevailing research ‘traditions’ surrounding pay structures and their
subsequent organisational impact.  The first related to the contentious issue of
management control.  By explicitly linking an employee’s pay to their performance
it strengthens the managers control of the employment relationship. There are
characteristics implicit to the relationship between employer and employee
concerning levels of effort, the so-called ‘wage-effort bargain’. One of these is how
does an employer ensure that all employees work productively with their output is
stimulated? Conversly, the employees also seek to exert control by varying the level
of effort employed and their skills utilised.  Coupled with this, according to Kessler
and Purcell, managers are also following their own personal agenda that further
distorts the payment system causing dissatisfaction and often ultimately failure.
The second research tradition referred to the management decision process
underlying the choice of reward structures.  This referred in part to the theoretical
work on employee motivation, but also to the strategic ‘fit’ of reward structures to
different organisations, dependant upon factors such as sector and market.  This
tradition has a secondary focus surrounding the issue of implementation with the
emphasis on ensuring effectiveness.  The objectives for implementing PRP are
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nebulous, but include the need or desire to attract and retain high quality employees,
facilitate organisational culture change or restructure the role of unions and
collective agreements with representative bodies for pay negotiations.  However, it
was Kessler and Purcell’s examination of the application and practice of PRP that
highlighted some worrying patterns.  Their research sought to examine closely the
three dimensions of PRP being the nature of the performance criteria, how
performance against such criteria is measured and how assessment is linked to pay.
Problems emerged relating to difficulties in setting performance objectives. Some
groups of employees, particularly the highly skilled, had ‘softer’ objectives set due
to the difficulty found in breaking down their roles into neat measurable objectives.
This led to divisions among employees and distortions in the pay scheme.  The
concept of cascading senior management objectives, derived from strategic
organisational objectives, proved to be less practical and relevant, for the employees
at least, further down the organisational hierarchy.  Coupled with this were the
difficulties encountered when assessing individual performance against the agreed
performance objectives.
The prevalence of the problems with PRP highlighted by Kessler and Purcell (1992)
and others (Marsden and Richardson 1994, Dowling and Richardson 1997, Lewis
1998, Redman et al. 2000) have been integrated into a debate with the HRM
literature about the contribution HRM makes to organisational performance (Guest
1997, Tyson, 1997, Paauwe and Richardson 1997, Lähteenmäki et al. 1998,
Doorewaard and Meihuizen 2000).  At the centre of the debate is the role of rewards,
with the most prevalent tool for harnessing employee commitment and sustained
performance being PRP. Hendry et al. (2000) claimed that successful human
resource outcomes are not necessarily congruent with organisational outcomes,
making the measurement of HRM on business performance problematical. PRP
relies on the assumption that pay is a reward and that employees will increase, or at
the very least maintain, their performance in lieu of payment.  This assumption is
inherently flawed according to Hendry et al (2000):
“Incentives are controlling because they contain the implicit threat of
punishment or with holding of the reward.  The problem is a complex
one, and the reaction to incentives can produce negative behaviour in
a number of ways, from the single-minded pursuit of only that which
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delivers rewards, to the subversion of incentives because people resent
the perceived attempt to control them.” (p. 47)
Managers assume that employee’s output must be measured and used as the basis for
payment.  However, Hendry et al. proposed that the measurement of employee’s
performance is vitiated by the obsession with control and is there fore liable to
undermine, rather than contribute to performance.  If the environment in which the
employees work is de-motivating or not stimulating it is inappropriate to implement
PRP because it is inherently unfair because the employees cannot flourish.  PRP
should only be in place in an environment where the employees are able to improve
their skills and gain new knowledge.  PRP is often subverted by a lack of clarity over
the purpose of a performance orientated rewards scheme, how that scheme is going
to contribute to organisational performance whilst also meeting the needs of
employees and how organisational objectives can, if possible at all, be formulated
into individual objectives.  This is then even further complicated by the tenuous link
between those performance measures and reward. This raises the important question:
“…employees may be financially motivated, but are they motivated to
do the things which contribute effectively to business strategy?” (p.
53)
4. Research intentions and proposed method
Academics researching reward strategies and policies in the NHS acknowledge that
there is a gap in the literature surrounding their effect on performance (Mardsen and
Richardon 1994, Dowling and Richardson 1997).  Coupled with this is the fact that
Agenda for Change is a completely new initiative, with some of the details still
under negotiation. The proposed study will have three key thrusts: motivation and
performance, the concept of flexibility and pay design.
Firstly in terms of motivation and performance it will be necessary to examine the
effects, if any, that performance-related pay (PRP) has on motivation and employee
performance.  Grimshaw (2000) claims that “there is limited evidence of the
positive contribution of PRP to productivity.” He further draws attention to the
detrimental effect on teamwork caused by PRP, which is inherently individualistic.
This has significant implications in the NHS because traditional and many new
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working practices rely on multi-disciplinary teams. However, the way the new pay
structure aims to make individual employees accountable for their own
performance.  The acquisition of new skills will form the basis of pay and career
progression and this will completely erode the hierarchical structure of the
organisation on a micro and a macro level.  It is also necessary to provide a new
insight into the strategic ‘fit’ of PRP in an organisation as large as the NHS.
The Government places flexibility at the heart of NHS modernisation.  This will
mean a complete culture change to dismantle the rigid hierarchical structure of the
NHS both in terms of job roles but tasks and responsibilities too.  Demarcation is
inherent in the way tasks are performed with clear delineated roles dictating who is
responsible for specific functions.  Finally, there is the issue of how the new pay
structure will impact on the way employees are managed and perform. Ultimately
the objective is to make the NHS more responsive to patient demands whilst also
becoming cost efficient.  However, as Grimshaw (2000) found, conflict occurred
where demand for a responsive organisation, driven by political intervention, was at
odds with strict patient activity targets.  These are factors that are unique to the
NHS and have not adequately been researched.
This research will be conducted using two case study organisations within the NHS,
within two different Regional Health Authorities, to allow comparisons between
them to be identified and analysed.  Case studies will enable me to provide a three
dimensional picture which will illustrate relationships, micro-political issues and
patterns of influence affecting reward design and strategies.  To gauge perceptions of
the proposed changes, and their implementation, data will be collected using
structured interviews and possibly questionnaires.  Structured interviews allow me to
meet with identified groups of employees and interview them regarding issues
relating to their own experience prior, during and after the transition.  Data will be
collected from employees, policy implementers and employee representatives.
Measuring and quantifying factors related to behaviour change is very difficult using
quantitative research methods. Quantitative research conducted by Dowling and
Richardson (1997) proved to be inconclusive and at odds with work by other
academics examining the effects of pay policies in the public sector.  They state
themselves that “these different motives imply a plethora of possible consequences
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by which PRP might be evaluated, some of them very hard to measure directly.”
(p.350)
5 Conclusion
This paper has outlined the raft of changes that the NHS has endured over the past
two decades and the latest attempt to reform pay specifically under Agenda for
Change.  It has also identified the lack of empirical research and the evident effect
that has had on the state of knowledge in this field.  The lack of clarity surrounding
what affects employee performance has led to the assumption that sophisticated
reward structures can result in desired outputs usually linked to organisational
objectives.  Studies have found that pay may actually be a de-motivator when used to
reward performance (Hendry et al. 2000). The traditional aims of a payment system
are to motivate, attract and retain staff in a fair and equitable way.  Reward
Management is now perceived to be an important ingredient of business strategy and
synonymous with improving efficiency and performance within organisations.  “The
emphasis has moved from relatively inflexible salary structures to the increasing use
of performance related reward systems used to change the culture to one which
encourages innovation, enterprise and entrepreneurial spirit” (Armstrong and Murliss
1994).  There is a need to conduct more research into pay practices in the NHS and
to examine those within a wider comparative national framework.
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